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Understanding the dynamics of the term structure of interest rates is of great signi￿cance
in macroeconomics. Bond prices contain important information about expectations of
future monetary policy and in￿ ation. With regards to the latter, the development of
in￿ ation-indexed bond markets in several countries in recent years has provided a useful
observation of real rates and risk-adjusted in￿ ation expectations. We make use of these
data to better evaluate the ability of theoretical models to explain the link between the
economy and the yield curve. In addition to its signi￿cance for the conduct of monetary
policy, studying the term structure can provide insights into the asset pricing implications
of macroeconomic models.
The question our paper is concerned with is what can explain the slope of the nominal
yield curve. Is it the term structure of real interest rates or the term structure of in￿ ation
compensation (which itself re￿ ects both in￿ ation expectations and in￿ ation risk premia)?
So far there has been considerable disagreement about this issue in the literature, with
most structural macro models pointing to the former and many atheoretical empirical
￿nance models pointing to the latter explanation. Our goal is to decompose the nominal
yield curve into its three constituent parts. We de￿ne in￿ ation risk premia (henceforth,
IRP￿ s) as the di⁄erence between nominal yields and the sum of real yields and in￿ ation
expectations. In other words, IRP￿ s measure the departure from the Fisher hypothesis
of interest rate parity.
We are interested in explaining the recently observed upward slope of in￿ ation com-
pensation in UK data as well as determining the relative roles of real rates and in￿ ation
compensation in the dynamics of the nominal term structure. In particular, even after
the adoption of in￿ ation targeting in the UK in 1992, long term in￿ ation compensation
has been signi￿cantly higher than short term in￿ ation compensation. To the extent that
unconditional in￿ ation expectations are constant (as one might expect in an in￿ ation tar-
geting setting), an upward (or downward) average slope of in￿ ation compensation should
re￿ ect in￿ ation risk premia rising (or falling) with maturity. Producing IRP in that
magnitude within the structural models has been unsuccessful in the structural macro
models.
Alternatively, we propose a di⁄erent explanation of the observed term structure of
in￿ ation compensation, namely, regime switching in the conditional expectations of long-
run in￿ ation. We take advantage of the relatively long history of observed in￿ ation-linked
treasury yields in the UK, spanning a period over which there was at least one well-
documented discrete change in the conduct of monetary policy in that country. The
1results from an estimated DSGE model with Markov switching in the central bank￿ s
in￿ ation target indicate that the observed average slope of in￿ ation compensation re￿ ects
long-run expectations of rather infrequent regime changes rather than risk premia. We
￿nd that the change in monetary policy can explain the observed change in the slope of
in￿ ation compensation in the UK. We also ￿nd that before the introduction of in￿ ation
targeting in 1992, the variation in the nominal slope primarily re￿ ected the variation of
the term structure of in￿ ation compensation, whereas after that time it was substantially
a⁄ected by changes in the real slope. The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we
discuss the recent literature. In section 3 we document the empirical facts that we focus
on in the paper. In section 4 we present our structural model and estimation results.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Explaining the nominal slope
Our paper attempts to throw light on the decomposition of in￿ ation compensation into
an expectations part and a risk premium part. With regards to the implications for
in￿ ation risk premia, there seems to be a disagreement between the literature on New
Keynesian (henceforth, NK) models on the one hand and the no-arbitrage macro-￿nance
VAR literature on the other. Because the latter uses a very ￿ exible speci￿cation for the
stochastic discount factor that prices all assets, it has estimated signi￿cant in￿ ation risk
premia in the nominal term structure. Models with micro-founded stochastic discount
factors however, either have di¢ culty matching this empirical ￿nding or face serious
trade-o⁄s in their ￿t to other variables when they do.
Before we continue, we need to introduce precise de￿nitions of the terms we use
throughout the paper. If yn
t is the continuously compounded yield on a n-period nominal
bond and rn
t is the yield on the corresponding real bond, then in￿ ation compensation is
simply the di⁄erence between the two: yn
t ￿ rn







i=1Et￿t+i, where ￿t+i is the in￿ ation rate in period
t.
What we refer to as the "term spread" is the simple di⁄erence between long-term and
short-term yields: yn
t ￿ y1
t. Conditional on information at a certain point in time the
term spread could in general depend on expectations of the future path of real short rates
and in￿ ation. Unconditionally, however, real short rates and in￿ ation should be constant
in a stationary setting and therefore the average term spread re￿ ects only investors￿
preferences for holding a long-term bond over investing in short-term bonds and rolling
2those over a period equal to the maturity of the long-term bond. We call this quantity
the "term premium". It is simply the di⁄erence between the current long-term yield and






Therefore, the nominal term spread or slope can be decomposed into three compo-
nents: the real slope (rn
t ￿r1




and the slope of in￿ ation risk premia (IRP n
t ￿ IRP 1
t ). We now present a summary of
alternative views on this decomposition.
Hordahl et al. (2007) (henceforth, HTV) construct a theoretical NK model which they
try to calibrate to data in terms of its implications for the term structure and moments
of macro variables. They ￿nd that the average term premia in the nominal yield curve
have little to do with in￿ ation risk and are due to real risk premia. Ravenna and Seppala
(2007a, 2007b) (henceforth, RS) perform a similar calibration exercise, working with a
NK model in the same class with habits, no in￿ ation indexation, persistent technology
and preference shocks and a transitory monetary policy shock. Like HTV, they ￿nd that
real term premia account almost entirely for the upward average slope of the yield curve
and that in￿ ation risk premia are negligible and even negative.
Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) use an endowment-economy model with exogenous
consumption and in￿ ation processes. Their model generates signi￿cant in￿ ation risk
premia that rise with maturity. This is achieved through the combined e⁄ect of two
features. First, they estimate the joint process for consumption growth and in￿ ation using
US postwar data and ￿nd that the correlation between consumption growth and lagged
in￿ ation is negative. Then, by introducing recursive utility for the representative agent,
they obtain a real pricing kernel that depends negatively on revisions in expectations
of future consumption growth. This way, higher in￿ ation can have opposite e⁄ects on
the yields of real and nominal bonds respectively. Feeding the estimated process for
consumption and in￿ ation through their preference structure, Piazzesi and Schneider
￿nd that the average nominal curve is upward sloping and the average real curve is
downward sloping.
Rudebusch and Swanson (2008a, 2008b) have recently claimed that the relatively bet-
ter success of endowment-economy models is mainly due to the fact that unlike many
production-based models they use the "right" covariance between consumption and in-
￿ ation by construction. On the other hand, models with endogenous production and
labor supply fail to produce enough volatility in the consumption process and speci￿cally
in conditional expectations of long-run consumption growth. Therefore the long-term
marginal rate of substitution of the representative agent is not volatile enough and those
3models do not generate substantial risk premia. Models such as Piazzesi and Schneider
(2006) also employ more exotic preference speci￿cations to translate the "right" process
for consumption into the "right" process for marginal utility.
In contrast to NK models, the empirical no-arbitrage macro-￿nance VAR literature
often ￿nds signi￿cant in￿ ation risk premia. In particular, Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2008)
￿nd that the US real term structure has been ￿ at on average while the upward sloping
nominal term structure has re￿ ected high in￿ ation risk premia that increase with matu-
rity. They use a no-arbitrage VAR with a Markov regime switching speci￿cation for the
joint dynamics of the state variables, without imposing any economic structure on the
correlation of in￿ ation and the unobservable real factors.
Their results are consistent with what one ￿nds in studies from countries such as the
UK. In particular, Evans (1998) estimates the real term structure for the UK and, using
EH regressions, ￿nds evidence for in￿ ation risk premia. Risa (2001) also uses UK nominal
and index-linked bond data and estimates a no-arbitrage VAR. He ￿nds a variable and
high on average in￿ ation risk premium for the UK, which has however fallen over time.
Empirical evidence for sizeable and time-varying in￿ ation risk premia was also found
by Hordahl and Tristani (2007) for European data as well as by D￿ Amico, Kim and Wei
(2008) for US data. Both papers rely on no-arbitrage macro-￿nance VAR￿ s for their
results and the latter also utilizes in￿ ation indexed bond data.
Our paper also draws on previous empirical studies estimating term structure models
with regime shifts. We already mentioned the empirical ￿ndings of Ang et al. (2008).
From Bansal and Zhou (2002) we borrow the bond pricing methodology for our regime-
switching model. Our paper is also close in spirit to Bikbov (2005), who estimates a
linearized NK model with regime switching. Where we depart from his study is in our
use of a micro-founded rather than an exogenous pricing kernel. In addition, we focus
our attention on the model￿ s ability to produce an upward sloping term structure on
in￿ ation compensation. To the extent that we estimate a production-based model with
a Markov-switching in￿ ation target for the central bank, our exercise resembles that of
Liu et al. (2008), the main di⁄erence being that we utilize term structure data in our
estimation.
43 A ￿rst look at the data
Our goal in this section is to document the salient features of the data which a good model
should be expected to reproduce. We demonstrate that in￿ ation compensation has been
upward sloping on average in recent UK data. We also show that in￿ ation compensation
appears to have been relatively stable in recent years with most of the variation in the
nominal slope coming from the real slope. On the other hand, it appears that variations
in in￿ ation compensation played a much larger role in determining variations in nominal
bond yields in previous periods in the UK.
Establishing the "stylized facts" has been relatively straightforward for nominal yields,
where previous studies have focused on replicating the average slope of the yield curve,
the term structure of yield volatilities and rejections of the EH as demonstrated by OLS
regressions. Data on these variables is readily available and the statistics are easily
computable.
With real yields and in￿ ation compensation, de￿ned as the di⁄erence between nomi-
nal and real yields, agreeing on those "stylized facts" is a bit more di¢ cult. The reason
for that is that in￿ ation compensation as de￿ned above (also referred to by bond market
participants as "breakeven in￿ ation") contains expectations as well as risk premia. Sep-
arating the two is very di¢ cult in the data (e.g. using in￿ ation forecasts from surveys)
and previous studies has often relied on speci￿c modeling assumptions.
3.1 Data description
We focus on the UK data in this study, because of the availability of longer time series for
real yields. We use data on UK zero-coupon yields compiled and computed by the Bank
of England and available on the Bank￿ s web site. These go back to 1985 for real yields and
1978 for nominal yields. We end the sample period at December 2007 so as to exclude
the ￿nancial crisis period. The yields have been estimated from the prices of traded
securities using a spline methodology and in￿ ation-linked yields have been adjusted for
the indexation lag and for seasonality.1
For the estimation of our DSGE model for the UK we use quarterly data on Retail
Price Index (henceforth, RPI) in￿ ation and household consumption take from the O¢ ce
1For more details on the methodology, please refer to Anderson and Sleath (2001). They report
that their method produces very stable yield curves in the sense that they show little sensitivity to
measurement error in the prices of the underlying bonds.
5of National Statistics (ONS). We motivate the choice of the RPI for measuring the price
level by the fact that this is the index which UK in￿ ation protected bonds are linked to.
Because the original series is not seasonally adjusted we follow Risa (2001) and adjust it
using the X-12 method.
3.2 Yield curve slope
Table 1 shows the means of the yield levels in the UK for di⁄erent periods. Clearly,
the levels of real and nominal yields and breakeven in￿ ation all decreased in the recent
subsample. However, we are less interested in the levels, which might re￿ ect secular
trends in in￿ ation, than in the di⁄erences between yields at long and short maturities.
The slopes of the di⁄erent yield curves contain a lot more information about expectations
and risk premia.
We focus on the slope between 10-year and 2-year yields because in￿ ation-indexed
yields with shorter maturities su⁄er from measurement error issues and are not reliably
estimated. Securities with less than 2 years to maturity have been excluded from the
￿tting procedure due to their erratic behavior resulting from the e⁄ects of seasonality
and indexation lag. In particular, prices for bonds with little time remaining to maturity
become more sensitive to in￿ ation accretion and short term in￿ ation expectations can be
extremely volatile.
Figure 1 presents the data for our two subsamples - before and after October 1992. We
can see that in di⁄erent periods, characterized by di⁄erent types of monetary policy, the
nominal curve slope has been driven by di⁄erent components. In particular, the slope of
in￿ ation compensation has been a lot more stable in recent times. A comparison between
the ￿rst two panels shows that the movements of the nominal slope have been more
correlated with the movements in the breakeven in￿ ation slope in the ￿rst subsample and
more correlated with movements in the real curve slope in the second. The correlations in
the ￿rst subsample were 0.63 between the nominal and breakeven slope and 0.26 between
the nominal and real slope. In the second subsample these ￿gures stood at 0.39 each. If
we restrict the second subsample to only the period after the Bank of England acquired
operational independence in 1997, the correlations become 0.27 and 0.49 respectively,
thus reversing their relative magnitude.
That being said, the last panel of Figure 1 indicates that while more stable, in￿ ation
compensation has been upward sloping in recent times. The di⁄erence between 2-year
and 10-year breakeven in￿ ation has averaged about 40 basis points. Our main goal in this
6paper is to explain this fact given the Bank of England￿ s commitment to a low in￿ ation
target.
One can see in the third panel of Figure 1 that before October 1992 the breakeven
in￿ ation slope (as well as the nominal curve slope) has been negative on average. This has
partly preceded and partly coincided with a period of steady decline in UK in￿ ation rates
and nominal interest rates. As the ￿gure shows, UK long-term interest rates decreased
gradually throughout the 1990￿ s.
Therefore it seems reasonable to hypothesize that the slope of breakeven in￿ ation in
our ￿rst subsample has re￿ ected expectations of future in￿ ation rates rather than risk
premia. By the same token it could be the case that the slope of breakeven in￿ ation in
the second subsample also has re￿ ected certain expectations about in￿ ation. The UK
evidence may suggest a shift from a period with relatively high in￿ ation and expectations
of decreasing in￿ ation to a period characterized by low in￿ ation and expectations of
increasing in￿ ation. This would have dramatically steepened the slope of the in￿ ation
compensation term structure from possibly very negative to positive.
4 DSGE Model Estimation
4.1 Markov regime switching in the in￿ ation target
In this paper, we propose a mechanism whereby the average term structure of in￿ ation ex-
pectations can have a positive slope for a prolonged period of time. This can be achieved
through a level of in￿ ation that alternates between di⁄erent regimes with relatively low
frequency. This way, in each regime the current level of in￿ ation is below or above the
long-term expectations of in￿ ation, which eventually converge to the ergodic mean of the
regime-switching process. Hence, the observed slope of in￿ ation compensation depends
on the level of in￿ ation in each regime and on the probabilities of moving from one regime
to another.
We have already seen that the behavior of bond yields has been quite di⁄erent over
di⁄erent periods in time. It could be argued these periods coincide with changes in the
behavior of macroeconomic variables. For example, many authors document the so called
"Great Moderation" in the US, while still disagreeing on its ultimate causes ￿improved
monetary policy or reduced exogenous volatility. Other papers, such as Schorfheide
(2005), make a case that there have been di⁄erent regimes for the Fed￿ s in￿ ation target.
The work of Bekaert et al. (2001) and Bansal and Zhou (2002) also suggest that regime
7switching can be useful in explaining the historical evolution of yields and bond returns.
All of this serves as motivation to explore the role of Markov regime switching in
accounting for the term structure. We explore this issue in the context of a DSGE model,
because we wish to take account of the way in which the dynamics of real variables as well
as in￿ ation should be di⁄erent as a consequence of the switches between policy regimes
(and awareness of the possibility of switches), and we need a structural model in order
to analyze this. We estimate our model using UK data because it provides us with a
good case study. Besides the availability of data on real yields, it is characterized by a
well de￿ned break in the way monetary policy was conducted - the adoption of in￿ ation
targeting.
After the "Black Wednesday" of 16 September 1992, on 8 October that year the UK
government announced it was leaving the European ERM mechanism and that it would
adopt an in￿ ation target in a wide band between 1% and 4% annually, based on the retail
price index excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX). The stated objective was to
have in￿ ation below the mid-point of this range (2.5%) by the end of the 1992-1997 par-
liament. On 14 June 1995 the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced an in￿ ation target
of 2.5% or less. In May 1997 the Bank of England was given operational independence in
achieving the government￿ s in￿ ation objective, which was itself amended to a symmetri-
cal target of 2.5% annual RPIX in￿ ation. Finally, in April 2003 the targeted price level
measure was changed to the harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP or CPI) and on
12 December that year the target was lowered to 2%. One might conjecture that more
than of these events could correspond to a change in policy regime. In our empirical
work, we do not pre-judge the timing of any regime changes, and instead estimate the
likelihood that a regime change has occurred at any date.
4.2 Model Description
The model we consider consists of three building blocks - a representative consumer who
maximizes utility and supplies labor, a private sector with monopolistically competitive
￿rms and a central bank that sets monetary policy. We focus on the most basic version of
the sticky price model discussed in Woodford (2003), abstracting from investment, ￿scal
policy and a number of other features such as certain types of nominal and real frictions.
84.2.1 Consumers
The representative household has a time-separable utility function with internal habits















Its preferences over the consumption stream are characterized by the subjective discount
factor ￿, the risk aversion parameter ￿ and the internal habit persistence parameter ￿.
We also tried using external habits and found that this does not materially change the
results. The curvature of the disutility of labor is determined by the ! parameter. Here
Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on information up to time t. There is
also a preference shock to the consumer￿ s marginal utility. It follows an autoregressive
process in logs with a zero mean.




Here and afterwards ￿i and ￿i denote the ￿rst-order autocorrelation and conditional
volatility of the exogenous process i respectively. "i
t is an i.i.d. zero-mean shock.
Consumers maximize utility subject to a budget constraint whereby the nominal value
of their consumption and investments in assets must be less than or equal to their current
labor income and asset returns from previous periods. We assume households have access
to a set of securities spanning all possible contingencies and including shares of all ￿rms
in the economy.
4.2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of producers indexed by i, each producing a di⁄erentiated good.
All producers have access to the same linear technology where output is given by
Yt (i) = AtLt (i) (3)
where Lt (i) is the labor demand of ￿rm i. Since the equilibrium wage is the same for all
sectors and ￿rms, we implicitly assume that the labor supply of each type i is determined
by the labor demand so that the market is cleared. The level of technology is stationary
and follows an AR(1) process.




9In order to have a non-trivial role for monetary policy, we assume that ￿rms follow Calvo
(1983) pricing with a probability of not optimizing prices in a given period equal to ￿.
In addition, we allow ￿rms who do not optimize prices to index them to lagged in￿ ation
Pt (i) = Pt￿1 (i)￿
￿
t￿1 (5)
￿ is the parameter governing the degree of indexation and can take values from 0 to
1. Firms maximize the discounted stream of expected nominal pro￿ts, valuing future
cash ￿ ows with the representative consumer￿ s stochastic discount factor. The resulting
￿rst order conditions of the ￿rms￿and consumers￿maximization problem are used to
determine the equilibrium in the economy and solve for the dynamics.
4.2.3 Monetary policy
Finally, to close the model, we specify monetary policy as follows. The nominal short
interest rate is set by a central bank that follows a Taylor rule with monetary policy



















￿￿ and ￿y are parameters governing the systematic response of the bank to deviations of
in￿ ation and output from the target ￿￿
t and the natural rate of output Y n
t respectively.
Y n
t is de￿ned as equilibrium output in an economy where ￿ = 0. ￿ is the inverse of
the steady-state output gap, which depends on the steady-state level of in￿ ation. ￿t is a





The value of the target ￿￿
t = ￿￿ (st) depends on the current state of an unobserved
discrete-valued S-state Markov switching variable st (st = 1;2;::S). We assume that
regime changes are governed by a Markov chain with a transition matrix P, whose element
pij = P(st = ijst￿1 = j) is the probability of moving to regime i given that the current
state is j such that
PS
i=1pij = 1 for all j. In our estimation we allow for two regimes in
the in￿ ation target of the central bank and set S = 2.
4.3 Model solution and bond price computation
Detailed derivations of the ￿rst order conditions for the model can be found in Appendix
A. We log-linearize them around the non-stochastic steady state of the model, where we
10set in￿ ation equal to its ergodic mean. In its log-linear form, the model can be written
as
BXt = M (st) + AEtXt+1 + CXt￿1 + D"t (8)
where Xt is a vector containing the model￿ s endogenous variables. Besides the Markov





t, which are collected in the vector "t. As shown in Appendix B.1, the solution
to our model is a regime-switching VAR of the form
Xt+1 = ￿(st+1) + ￿Xt + ￿"t+1 (9)
where the intercept term depends on the regime probabilities pij as well as the regime-
dependent in￿ ation target ￿￿ (st).
Because there is no regime switching in the A, B and C coe¢ cient matrices we can ￿rst
apply standard linear rational expectations methods to solve for the transition matrix ￿
and then use the set of equations




Appendix B.2 provides details on the bond price computation algorithm under regime
switching. It is shown by Ang et al. (2008) that when ￿ is not regime-dependent, bond
prices are computed exactly. In the case when ￿ does depend on regimes, bond prices can
be computed approximately (with a very small approximation error) as shown by Bansal
and Zhou (2002). Finally, using the model solution and bond pricing method we can
compute the expectations and variances of yields and in￿ ation conditional on di⁄erent
regimes. Details of the conditional moment computations can be found in Appendix B.3.
The resulting equations for the real and nominal bond yields with n quarters to
















We estimate our model using Bayesian techniques, which allow us to specify priors for
the distribution of certain parameters, based on previous studies and on certain data
moments. We use the Hamilton-Kim ￿lter for computing the likelihood as well for ￿nding
11the probabilities of the two regimes.2 This allows us to compute the posterior distribution
of the model parameters up to an integrating constant. Here, we show the posterior mode
estimates that maximizes the posterior likelihood of the model.
4.4.1 Likelihood computation
In our estimation we use eight UK time series. These are per capita consumption growth,
RPI in￿ ation, nominal bond yields with maturities of 1, 2, 5 and 10 years and real bond
yields with maturities of 5 and 10 years. The data, represented by the vector Yt, is related
to the state variables Xt by the observation equation
Yt = A(st) + BXt + ￿eet (10)
The intercept term A(st) contains the sample means of in￿ ation and consumption growth
as well as regime-dependent intercept terms for bond yields. The coe¢ cients in B contain
the bond pricing coe¢ cients bN
n and bR
n as well as the identity mapping between the model
variables ￿yt and ￿t and their data counterparts: demeaned per capita consumption
growth and RPI in￿ ation.
We allow for measurement errors in the observation equation represented by the i.i.d.












Thus we have a state space system of the form
Yt = A(st) + BXt + ￿eet
Xt+1 = ￿(st+1) + ￿Xt + ￿"t+1
The matrices A(st), B, ￿(st), ￿ and ￿ all depend on the model￿ s structural parame-








Let Y t denote the data up to and including period t: Y t = (Y0;Y1;:::;Yt). Our goal

















2Please refer to Kim(1994) and Hamilton (1989) for details. Our exposition of the methodology
follows Kim and Nelson (1999).






we need to make an inference about the unobserved states
Xt. We do that by using the algorithms proposed by Hamilton (1989) and Kim (1994).
Appendix B.4 provides the details.
4.4.2 Estimating the posterior mode
Given a prior distribution p(￿) and the likelihood L
￿
Y T￿ ￿ ~ ￿
￿
, we can compute the value




T￿ ￿ ~ ￿
￿
p(￿) (11)
As discussed in Liu et al. (2008), since the posterior density function is in general
non-Gaussian and with a complicated shape, it is important to ￿nd the its mode by
maximizing (11). This we do as follows.
We ￿rst make 1,000,000 draws from the prior distribution and estimate the value of
posterior for each one of them. Then we use the ￿fty with the highest posterior values
as initial parameter vectors for a sequence of non-linear optimizations.3 Our results are
based on the highest local maximum of the posterior that we ￿nd.
4.4.3 Priors
The dimensionality of ~ ￿ is large, with 21 di⁄erent parameters. Therefore we split it into
two parts: ￿, which we estimate, and ￿ ￿, which we ￿x a priori. The elements of ￿ ￿ were
determined as follows. We set the discount factor ￿ = 0:995, which corresponds to a
2% steady-state real short rate. We set the CES parameter ￿ = 10 corresponding to a
mark-up of 11%, which is in the neighborhood of the one estimated by previous DSGE
models. We set the Calvo parameter ￿ to 0:75 and the Taylor rule￿ s output gap response
coe¢ cient ￿y to 0:1 (corresponding to a 0:4 coe¢ cient for the annualized output gap).
For the remaining sixteen parameters, we give priors that are in line with earlier stud-
ies employing Bayesian methods for estimating DSGE models. The prior distributions
of those parameters are summarized in the ￿rst three columns of Table 2.
3We used the optimisation routines available on Chris Sims￿ s web site as well as the fminsearch
function from MATLAB￿ s Optimization Toolbox, which is based on the Nelder-Mead search method.
13The prior distribution of the utility curvature parameter ￿ is Gamma with a mean of
3 and a standard deviation of 1. We allow for a higher value than usual for the utility
function curvature parameter in order to improve the ￿t to bond yields.
The inverse Frisch elasticity ! has a mean of 3 and a standard deviation of 0:75 as in
Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2005). The 5% ￿ 95% bounds for the prior distribution of
! correspond to a Frisch elasticity between 0:123 and 0:53.
We allow for a rather loose prior for the monetary policy inertia parameter in the
Taylor rule ￿I with mean of 0:7 and standard deviation 0:2. The 5% ￿ 95% bounds for
the prior distribution are 0:32 and 0:97 respectively.
The prior for the AR(1) coe¢ cient for the technology process mean value of 0:9
and standard deviation of 0:05. We also tried looser priors for this parameter but the
estimates did not change signi￿cantly. The prior for the preference shock persistence has
a mean of 0:6 and standard deviation of 0:2 as in Justiniano and Primicieri (2007).
We use an Inverse Gamma (IG) distribution for all volatility parameters to guarantee
positivity. Our prior for the volatility of the technology shock has a mean value of 2:5%
and a standard error of 1%. The mean level is on the higher end of previous studies
but we have to compensate for the fact that our model lacks other important sources of
volatility such as capital adjustment or variable capacity utilization, which other studies
￿nd to add to the volatility of the output and consumption.
For the monetary policy shock we chose a mean of 0:05% implying that the central
bank cannot deviate by more than 0:4% from its target interest rate 95% of the time.
The mean and standard deviation of the volatility of the measurement error were set
to 10 basis points each.
We set the mean values for the in￿ ation target in each regime close to the mean values
for RPI in￿ ation in the pre and post ERM crisis subsamples. The standard deviation for
those parameters were set to 0:2% and 0:1% respectively. The low standard deviation for
the high in￿ ation target is to let the estimation easily distinguish between the low and
high in￿ ation regimes for a given period.
Finally, we set the mean of the probability of a transition from a low to a low in￿ ation
regime to 0:9, corresponding to an average duration of 10 quarters. We set a very loose
prior for the transition probability from a high to a high in￿ ation regime in order to give
the data enough ￿ exibility to distinguish between the low and high regimes. Our prior
mean for p22 is 0:6 corresponding to an average duration of 2:5 quarters.
144.5 Estimation results
4.5.1 Parameter estimates
We present the medians and standard deviations of the estimated posterior distributions
in Table 2. In general the data is quite informative for the estimated parameters. Given
the relatively ￿ at UK term structure, the estimated median for ￿ of 2:58 is much lower
than the one used by HTV to ￿t US term premia. The estimated in￿ ation target in the
high regime (regime 2) is 5:37%, which is close to the 5:48% mean of the ￿rst subsample.
The median of the in￿ ation target in regime 1 is estimated at 2:22% which is lower than
the post-1992 sample mean of in￿ ation of 2:71% but in between the actual announced
in￿ ation targets of the Bank of England of 2:5% and 2%.
The transition probabilities p11 and p22 have estimated medians of 0:98 and 0:95
respectively. This implies that the low-in￿ ation regime is more persistent. Despite its
very high persistence it is not an absorbing state. Therefore, even under the current
regime of in￿ ation targeting there is a non-negligible implied probability of reverting
to a high in￿ ation regime. This has a signi￿cant impact on the shape of the in￿ ation
compensation term structure.
4.5.2 Model ￿t
The estimated parameter values are of less interest themselves than their implications for
the model variables behavior. Table 3 gives the correlations between the observed values
of the variables and estimated values of the variables when the measurement errors that
are used in estimation are set to zero. Overall, the ￿t of the estimated variables are
quite good. However, it has to be underlined that estimating the real yields and longer
maturity nominal yields precisely proved to be harder. This is not surprising given that
the model has itself a short-term nominal variable (the policy rate set by the Central
Bank) and the high correlation between the shorter term yields. Still, the correlation
values suggest that the model is able to explain the movement of the breakeven rates,
which are actually not used in the estimation.
In three panels of the Figure 2 (the fourth is on the lower right panel), we see the ￿t
of the selected variables again when the measurement error terms are set to zero. It can
be seen that the model has a very good ￿t to observed consumption growth, in￿ ation
and 1-year nominal yield. This is not surprising given the large dimensionality of the
parameter vector.
15The last panel of Figure 2 shows the estimated regime probability of low-in￿ ation
regime. The transition between the high and low regimes is very clear. Our model
estimation suggests an in￿ ationary target switch happened at the end of 1991. This
seems to be at odds with the fact that the Bank of England adopted in￿ ation targeting
regime in 1992:Q4. To shed into light for this result, in Figures 3 and 4, we draw the
observed in￿ ation rate, observed breakeven in￿ ation spread respectively (de￿ned as the
10year minus 5 year breakeven rate) along with the model implied values. It has to be
noted that our identi￿cation for the regime switches for the in￿ ation target basically
exploits the in￿ ation rate and the breakeven in￿ ation spread. Given the low (high)
in￿ ation target regime, in￿ ation rate will be lower (higher) and because of higher (lower)
future expected in￿ ation breakeven in￿ ation rate will be higher (lower).
Although the Bank of England adopted the in￿ ation targeting in 1992:Q4, Figure
3 shows that the in￿ ation dropped signi￿cantly between 1990:Q2 and 1991:Q3 over 9.6
percent. Hence, the model gives a higher probability of being in the lower in￿ ation
regime starting from the end of 1991 given this signi￿cant drop in in￿ ation. As we can
see form Figures 2 to 4 that there has been a previous short-lived regime switch from
high in￿ ation regime to low in￿ ation regime 1986:Q1. In addition, the estimation suggests
another short-lived switch, this time from low-in￿ ation regime to high, in 1994:Q4. A
look at Figure4 shows that the break-even in￿ ation rates are the major culprit for these
short-lived switches as the observed breakeven rate spread nearly coincides with the
model-implied one.
Figure 5 shows the ￿t to variables that are functions of the variables used in the
observation equation. The ￿t to the breakeven in￿ ation rates is quite good whereas the
￿t to the nominal and real slope terms is somewhat worse but they still capture the
trends in the data.
4.5.3 Implications for breakeven in￿ ation
We now compare our results with the observed data moments for the nominal, real and
breakeven in￿ ation term structures. Figure 6 depicts the subsample averages predicted
values of the term structure for the pre- and post 1992:Q4, where the BOE adopted in￿ a-
tion targeting. Although, we found that the model shows an earlier date for the regime
switch, we still want to use 1992:Q4 to compare the predicted values from estimation to
the observed values drawn in Figure 1. As earlier, we use the 2 year maturity as the level
term of the term structure and the spreads are computed with this maturity. The only
bit where we di⁄er from the data is the slightly positive slope of the estimated real term
16structure in the second sample. This could possibly be a result of the institutional fea-
tures such as the regulations that require UK pension funds to invest in in￿ ation indexed
assets.
The bottom two panels of Figure 6 show the model implied unconditional average
shape of the term structure in both regimes. While they are slightly di⁄erent in magni-
tude (especially for the breakeven in￿ ation slope in the high in￿ ation regime) from the
sample means, they do have the same general shape. Hence we can conclude that our
model explains the observed term structure of breakeven in￿ ation fairly well. It produces
a breakeven slope in the second subsample that is very close to the one observed in data
and generates and even higher slope for the low in￿ ation regime in the population.
As noted earlier, pre- and post 1992:Q4 contain regime switches. To show that the
predicted values of term structures are not driven by these switches but rather they
conform to model implied unconditional term structures, we also subdivide the top panel
according to the predicted regime probabilities in Figure 7. As the ￿gure conforms, the
similar patterns are mainly dictated by the fact that a high (low) in￿ ation regime has a
downward (upward) sloping breakeven in￿ ation curve.
If we look at Figure 8 we can see the implied IRP￿ s (which are the same in both
regimes). Note that, given our model structure, unconditional IRP￿ s do not di⁄er across
regimes. They can account for only a tiny fraction of the in￿ ation compensation slope.
The highest value for the IRP is slightly higher than 5 basis points. This is not surprising
given other structural macro model results. The e⁄ect of regime-dependent conditional
expectations clearly dominates.
Finally, Figure 9 shows the comovement of the nominal, real and breakeven 10y-2y
slope in the two subsamples. We can see that in the ￿rst subsample the ￿tted nominal
slope is much more correlated with breakeven in￿ ation. The correlation between the two
is 0.82 whereas the correlation between the nominal and real slope is only 0.29. In the
second subsample the nominal-real correlation increases to 0.72 just like it does in the
data, whereas the nominal-breakeven correlation decreases to 0.66. These correlations
are higher as the ones in the data but the direction of the changes is very similar. We
conclude that the relative role of the real slope in the dynamics of the nominal curve
increased whereas that of in￿ ation compensation decreased. Thus our model agrees with
our preliminary observations of the data.
175 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the term structure of in￿ ation compensation and its contri-
bution to the nominal curve slope. We attempt to answer the question of why in￿ ation
compensation in the UK has been upward sloping during the time the Bank of England
has been committed to a low and stable in￿ ation target and propose a mechanism. In
particular, we estimate a DSGE model with Markov regime-switching in the in￿ ation tar-
get of the central bank and ￿nd that the period before the adoption of in￿ ation targeting
is basically characterized by a high in￿ ation target regime whereas the period after is
mostly a low-in￿ ation target regime. However, the model assign the regime switch date
before 1992:Q4 mostly because of a rapid disin￿ ation in the previous year. The model
also matches the breakeven in￿ ation slope observed in di⁄erent subsamples of UK data.
Thus our results attribute the slope of the UK breakeven in￿ ation to the conditional
expectations of long-run in￿ ation which changed substantially with the transition to a
new monetary policy regime.
Our model is a rational expectations model, where economic agents know the structure
of the economy as well as the statistical distributions of the exogenous shock including the
process for the regime-switching in￿ ation target. Therefore the term structure of in￿ ation
compensation is primarily determined by expectations. However, we have not ruled out
the existence of larger risk premia than our simple model suggests. For example, one
could incorporate risk premia via di⁄erent mechanisms involving the introduction of a
wedge between the beliefs of agents and the actual distribution of the underlying process
for in￿ ation.
Our regime-switching model can also be extended to allow for subjective transition
probabilities, di⁄erent from the ones governing the actual in￿ ation target process. In this
extended model breakeven in￿ ation could contain a signi￿cant component that is not
related to in￿ ation expectations under the objective physical measure without a⁄ecting
the real term structure to a large extent.
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TABLE 1: Sample means of nominal and real yields 
  1y  2y  5y  10y 
UK (1985:01-1992:10)         
Nominal yield  10.58  10.29  10.09  9.97 
Real yield  2.96  3.19  3.61  3.90 
Breakeven inflation  7.62  7.10  6.48  6.07 
         
UK (1985:01-1992:10)         
Nominal yield  5.35  5.52  5.76  5.81 
Real yield  2.72  2.64  2.58  2.54 













TABLE 2: Model Parameters: Priors and Estimates 
 
    Prior  Posterior 
Parameter  Distribution  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mode 
σ , Risk aversion  Gamma  3.00  1.00  2.58 
δ , Habit  Beta  0.40  0.15  0.36 
ω , Curvature for labor disutility  Gamma  3.00  0.75  7.03 
γ , Indexation  Beta  0.50  0.20  0.27 
φ_{π}, Taylor rule, inflation  Gamma  2.00  0.30  2.01 
ρ_{I}, Taylor rule, lagged interest rate  Beta  0.70  0.20  0.85 
ρ_{a}, Persistence, Technology shock  Beta  0.90  0.05  0.99 
ρ_{ξ}, Persistence, Preference shock  Beta  0.60  0.20  0.93 
100*η_{a}, Standard deviation, technology shock  IG  2.50  1.00  0.01 
100*η_{m}, Standard deviation, Taylor rule  IG  0.05  0.10  0.00 
100*η_{ξ}, Standard deviation, preference shock  IG  1.00  0.50  0.03 
π (1), Inflation target, low inflation regime  Normal  2.40  0.80  2.22 
π (2), Inflation target, high inflation regime  Normal  6.00  0.40  5.37 
p₁₁, Transition probability from low regime to low regime  Beta  0.90  0.05  0.98 
p₂₂, Transition probability from high regime to high regime  Beta  0.60  0.13  0.95 
100*η_{m}, Standard deviation, measurement error  IG  0.10  0.10  0.00 
         
β , Discount rate  Fixed  0.995     
χ , Coefficient for labor disutility  Fixed  1.00     
α , Calvo parameter  Fixed  0.75     
θ , Dixit-Stiglitz CES parameter  Fixed  10     





TABLE 3: Correlations for Observed and Fitted Variables 
  Level  Change 
Consumption growth  1.0000  1.0000 
Inflation  0.9985  0.9983 
1 year nominal yield  0.9912  0.9308 
2 year nominal yield  0.9979  0.9692 
5 year nominal yield  0.9898  0.8958 
10 year nominal yield  0.9678  0.8182 
5 year real yield  0.8971  0.5894 
10 year real yield  0.9488  0.6451 
5 year breakeven inflation rate  0.9433  0.4842 
10 year breakeven inflation rate  0.8643  0.2897 
Spread between 10 year and 1 year nominal 
yields  0.6968  0.2815 
Spread between 10 year and 5 year real yields  0.1631  0.1951 
Spread between 10 year and 1 year breakeven 
inflation rates  0.5812  0.7034 
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1A Model
A.1 Consumers
There is a continuum of goods in the economy indexed by i in the unit interval. Each
good is produced by a separate ￿rm. The representative consumer￿ s preferences over the










where C (i) is the consumption of good i. ￿ is a preference parameter describing the
elasticity of substitution between good i and good j. Consumer utility depends on the
aggregate consumption good Ct and labor supply Lt (i) to each ￿rm i in an additively
separable manner. We assume time-separable preferences with constant relative risk















Here, ￿ < 1 is a subjective discount factor, ￿ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution and ! and ￿ are parameters describing the disutility from labor.
The ￿ ow budget constraint of the representative agent is:
Z 1
0
Pt (i)Ct (i)di + Bt ￿ wtLt +
Z 1
0
￿t (i)di + Wt (3)
where Pt (i) is the nominal price of good i. From the consumer￿ s intratemporal cost-
minimization problem it can be shown that
Z 1
0
Pt (i)Ct (i)di = PtCt (4)









￿t (i) are the pro￿ts of ￿rm i, wt is the nominal wage paid by ￿rms, Wt is beginning of
period wealth, consisting of the nominal value of all asset holdings and Bt represents the
value end of period asset holdings. Complete markets imply the existence of a stochastic
discount factor Qt;t+1 such that
Bt = Et [Qt;t+1Wt+1] (6)








































where ￿t ￿ ￿tPt = (Ct ￿ ￿Ct￿1)















There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ￿rms in the economy, each with
some price-setting power. The degree of market power of each ￿rm depends on the CES
parameter of the representative consumer￿ s utility function. The demand curve for each
￿rm￿ s product is derived from the consumer￿ s intratemporal optimization problem and







Firms are price setters but not all of them get to optimize their price in each period.
Following Calvo (1983) and Christiano et al. (2001), we introduce both staggered price-
setting and in￿ ation indexation. In particular, in each period every ￿rm has a probability
1 ￿ ￿ of re-optimising its price. Firms who do not get to optimize their price in period
t, set it according to the formula:







Firms maximize pro￿ts which are given by
￿t (i) = Pt (i)Yt (i) ￿ TCt (i)
where TCt = wt(i)Lt (i), Yt (i) = AtLt (i), At is an exogenous aggregate productivity
shock. Assuming competitive factor markets, ￿rms take the common wage wt (i) = wt
as given. Firm i￿ s nominal marginal cost of producing an additional unit of output is:




3Substituting the labor supply condition (9) into the above equation we get that the








































From here, we get that in every period t+s > t, for a ￿rm that has not re-optimized its













TCt+s (i) = MCt+sYt+s (i) = mct+sPt+sYt+s (i) (15)



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Hence the relative price of the optimizing ￿rm can be expressed in recursive form









































By symmetry, the optimal price P ￿
t (i) for each ￿rm that gets to optimize in period
t should be the same and denote it by P ￿
t . Finally, note that the aggregate price level


































































































































































The central bank￿ s policy is described by an interest rate rule of the type:



















and ￿t is a monetary policy shock. ￿I is a parameter governing the degree of monetary










1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿(￿￿1)(1￿￿)













￿ Y n = 1
Clearly, when ￿ ￿ = 1 or ￿ = 1, we have ￿ = 1.
A.4 Exogenous disturbances
There are several sources of uncertainty in our baseline model. These are the technology
shock At, the monetary policy shock ￿t, the preference shock ￿t and the in￿ ation target
￿￿
t. We assume that the processes for those are given by





















and are independent standard normally distributed shock
processes uncorrelated with each other.
In our main model ￿￿
t follows a two-state Markov-switching process with transition










































































































































































































































9A.4.2 Natural rate of output
If prices were ￿ exible, the representative agent would optimize Pt (i) in every period in
order to maximize
￿t (i) = Pt (i)Yt (i) ￿ mctPtYt (i)











The ￿rst order condition for this maximization problem can be shown to be:





























Using the symmety of the individual price setters￿decisions, we can deduce that for each


































When there is no habit formation in the utility function ￿t = (Y n
t )











Hence, the natural rate of output Y n













With habit formation ￿t =
￿
Y n
t ￿ ￿Y n
t￿1
￿￿￿ ￿t ￿ ￿￿Et
h￿
Y n






























￿t = (Ct ￿ ￿Ct￿1)





















































































































































We are interested in model solutions around the non-stochastic steady state value of
in￿ ation ￿ ￿ which we allow to di⁄er from 1. Using the Euler equation (28) we obtain a
relationship between the steady-state interest rate and the representative agent￿ s discount
factor.
￿ I0 = ￿ I￿1 = ￿ ￿￿
￿1


























n ￿ ￿￿ Y
n￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿ Y






















Using the de￿nition for the marginal utility of consumption, we get:
￿ ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿ ￿ Y
￿￿
and from the aggregation equation we have:






















￿ s = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿






￿ s = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿




1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿(1￿￿)￿￿1
￿ L = ￿ Y ￿ s
From the ￿rm￿ s FOC￿ s for discounted pro￿ts maximization we obtain:














































1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿(1￿￿)￿
DC = ￿!
￿ Y !
















































1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿(1￿￿)￿
￿ Y
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿(￿￿1)(1￿￿) =
￿













1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿(￿￿1)(1￿￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ 1
￿￿1 1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿(￿￿1)(1￿￿)
















1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿(￿￿1)(1￿￿)





















1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿(￿￿1)(1￿￿)



















1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿(￿￿1)(1￿￿)






13B Regime switching models
B.1 Model set-up
We log-linearize the model equations de￿ned in Appendix A to obtain the following linear
system
B (st)Xt = M (st) + A(st)EtXt+1 + C (st)Xt￿1 + D(st)￿t
If we conjecture the solution
Xt+1 = ￿(st+1) + ￿(st+1)Xt + ￿(st+1)￿t+1
EtXt+1 = Et￿(st+1) + Et￿(st+1)Xt
and plug into the model equations, we match coe¢ cients and get
[B (st) ￿ A(st)Et￿(st+1)]Xt = M (st) + A(st)Et￿(st+1) + C (st)Xt￿1 + D(st)￿t
￿(st) = [B (st) ￿ A(st)Et￿(st+1)]
￿1 [M (st) + A(st)Et￿(st+1)]
￿(st) = [B (st) ￿ A(st)Et￿(st+1)]
￿1 C (st)
￿(st) = [B (st) ￿ A(st)Et￿(st+1)]
￿1 D(st)
This can also be written as
h












￿(i) = C (i)
h





The key equation to solve is
h




￿(i) = C (i)
and the rest follow. If, like in our model, A, B and C do not depend on the regime, then
￿ does not depend on regime either. The equation simpli￿es to a well-known generalized
eigenvalues problem. We re-write it as
A￿￿ ￿ B￿ + C = 0
and could apply familiar solution algorithms. Then we solve for ￿(st) and ￿(st) using
[B ￿ A￿]￿(i) = M (i) + A(i)
P
j￿ij￿(j)
[B ￿ A￿]￿(i) = D(i)
14B.2 Bond prices with regime switching
Here we present the most general case for computing bond prices, adapted from Bansal
and Zhou (2002). The state vector follows the process
xt+1 = ￿(st+1) + ￿(st+1)xt + ￿(st+1)
p
￿t"t+1





In our model, we have ￿(st+1) = ￿, ￿(st+1) = ￿, A = I, B = 0.
The reduced form equation for the pricing kernel is
qt;t+1 = ￿t+1 ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿t+1 ￿ ￿zt+1
qt;t+1 = (e￿ ￿ e￿ ￿ ￿ez)￿(st+1)+[(e￿ ￿ e￿ ￿ ￿ez)￿(st+1) ￿ e￿]xt+(e￿ ￿ e￿ ￿ ￿ez)￿(st+1)
p
￿t"t+1















Et (￿) ￿ E[￿jFt]












































m(j) + f (j)xt +
1
2






























































We guess that prices are of the form
b
n
t (st) = An (st) + Bn (st)xt
exp(b
n












Conditional on fFt;st+1g, qt;t+1 and b
n￿1
t+1 are jointly normal since both depend on the







































t+1 (st+1) = m(st+1) + f (st+1)xt + ￿m (st+1)
p
￿t"t+1 + An￿1 (st+1)
+ Bn￿1 (st+1)
h






t+1 (st+1) = m(st+1) + An￿1 (st+1) + Bn￿1 (st+1)￿(st+1)
+ [f (st+1) + Bn￿1 (st+1)￿(st+1)]xt










= m(st+1) + An￿1 (st+1) + Bn￿1 (st+1)￿(st+1)













[￿m (st+1) + Bn￿1 (st+1)￿(st+1)]













[￿m (st+1) + Bn￿1 (st+1)￿(st+1)]




[￿m (st+1) + Bn￿1 (st+1)￿(st+1)]














[￿m (st+1) + Bn￿1 (st+1)￿(st+1)]diag[￿m (st+1) + Bn￿1 (st+1)￿(st+1)]A
+
￿
[f (st+1) + Bn￿1 (st+1)￿(st+1)]
+1























m(j) + An￿1 (j) + Bn￿1 (j)￿(j)
+1






[f (j) + Bn￿1 (j)￿(j)]
+1
2 [￿m (j) + Bn￿1 (j)￿(j)]diag[￿m (j) + Bn￿1 (j)￿(j)]B
￿
B.3 Computing model moments
B.3.1 Conditional expectation E(Xtjst)
Xt+1 = ￿(st+1) + ￿Xt + ￿(st+1)"t+1
E(Xt+1jst+1) = E(￿(st+1)jst+1) + ￿E(Xtjst+1)
E(Xtjst+1 = i) =
Pns
j=1E(Xtjst)P(st = jjst+1 = i)
P(st = jjst+1 = i) ￿ bij = pji
￿j
￿i
pji = P(st+1 = ijst = j)
￿j = P(st = j)
E(Xt+1jst+1 = i) = E(￿(st+1)jst+1) + ￿
Pns
j=1E(Xtjst = j)bij
[E(Xt+1jst+1 = i)]nx￿1 = [E(￿(st+1)jst+1)]nx￿1+[￿]nx￿nx
hPns



































6 6 6 6 6
4
b11 ￿￿￿ bi1 ￿￿￿ bns1
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
b1j ￿￿￿ bij ￿￿￿ bnsj
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
b1ns ￿￿￿ bins ￿￿￿ bnsns
3
7 7 7 7 7
5





























































+ ￿(i)E[Xtjst+1 = i]
0 ￿(i)















0 + ￿(i)E[Xtjst+1 = i]
0 ￿(i)



































tji]) = vec(G(i)) +
P













tji] ￿ V (i)
















































vec(V ) = vec(G) + ￿vec
￿
In2


































B.4 Model estimation with the Hamilton-Kim ￿lter




Yt = A(st) + B (st)Xt + et
Transition equation We here present the general case where there is regime switching
in all of the model￿ s parameters.












The parameters are dependent on unobserved discrete-valued S-state Markov switching






p11 p12 ￿￿￿ p1S
p21 p22 ￿￿￿ p2S
. . .
. . . ... . . .





where pij = P[st = ijst￿1 = j] with
PS
i=1pij = 1 for all j: In what follows we denote






we need to make an inference about the unobserved states
Xt. The proposed algorithm is based on the Kalman ￿lter and calculates S2 forecasts for
each date t corresponding to every possible combination of past and future states i and
j; as well as S2 di⁄erent mean squared error matrices. Let X
i;j
tjt￿1 denote the predicted



















t￿1;st = j;st￿1 = i
i
















The conditional forecast errors of the observations are
￿
(i;j)
tjt￿1 ￿ Yt ￿ Aj ￿ BjX
(i;j)
tjt￿1














t;st = j;st￿1 = i
￿












￿0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Y
t;st = j;st = i
￿




















￿0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Y
t;st = j
￿






































As can be seen each iteration produces an S-fold increase in the number of cases to
consider. The key is to collapse terms in the right way at the right time. It remains
















Consider the following approximation. If X
(i;j)






i=1P[st￿1 = i;st = jjY t]X
(i;j)
tjt
P[st = jjY t]
where X
j
tjt would represent E[XtjY t;st = j]. In this case denote
￿t =
P[st￿1 = i;st = jjY t]
P[st = jjY t]
P
j
tjt, the mean-squared error matrix of Xt conditional on Y t and st = j could be derived










































￿0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Y






















￿0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Y
t;st￿1 = i;st = j
￿
































































































































































































P[st = jjY t]
So at the end of each iteration we collapse S￿S posteriors into S posteriors using this ap-
proximation to make the ￿lter operable. Notice however, that these collapsed posteriors




tjt (in the updating equations above) are not ex-









￿0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Y t;st = j;st￿1 = i
￿
since Xt conditional on Y t￿1; st = j; and st￿1 = i is a mixture of normals for t > 2.
However, this updating equation is still the linear projection of Xt on Y t and Xi
t￿1jt￿1
given st￿1 and st. However, this updating equation is still not a linear projection of Xt
on Y t ￿ fYt;Yt￿1;:::g: since Xi
t￿1jt￿1 is a non-linear function of Y t￿1 ￿ fYt￿1;Yt￿2;::g:
Inference on the probability terms via the Hamilton ￿lter




st = j;st￿1 = ijY
t￿1￿




for i;j = 1;2;:::S: where P[st = jjst￿1 = i] is of course the transition probability.
STEP 2: Consider the joint density of Yt;st and st￿1 :
f
￿








st = j;st￿1 = ijY
t￿1￿

























st = j;st￿1 = ijY
t￿1￿

































for i;j = 1;2;:::S:where ￿
(i;j)
tjt￿1 are computed from the above prediction equations.
24STEP 3: Once Yt is observed at the end of time t;we can update the probability
term P[st = j;st￿1 = ijY t￿1] to get
P
￿








f (Yt;st = j;st￿1 = ijY t￿1)
f (YtjY t￿1)
=
f (Ytjst = j;st￿1 = i;Y t￿1)f [st = j;st￿1 = ijY t￿1]
f (YtjY t￿1)
=
f (Ytjst = j;st￿1 = i;Y t￿1)P[st = j;st￿1 = ijY t￿1]
f (YtjY t￿1)










st = j;st￿1 = ijY
t￿1￿
Full procedure
Then the likelihood computation procedure works as follows. Given the parameter
vector ~ ￿, we start with an initial guess for the state vector X
j
0j0 and its mean square
error P
j
0j0. Then, from period 1 to period T, we run the ￿lter, which consists of three
stages:













by running the Kalman ￿lter conditional on the regimes st = j and st￿1 = i for each i
and j.
STAGE 2: Compute P(st;st￿1jY t￿1), the likelihood of the current observation yt,
L(ytjY t￿1;￿), P(st;st￿1jY t) and P(stjY t) using the Hamilton ￿lter.





back to Step 1.
Finally, we sum up the log-likelihood for each period to get the log-likelihood for the
whole sample.
25